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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the grant of the first Commercial Mobile Radio Service
("CMRS") license over twenty years ago, the wireless industry has grown
from a service of convenience to one that is indispensable. What once was
a device used for sporadic phone calls now is viewed by many Americans
as a source of invaluable communication and security. Across the country,
people use their wireless phones to make many, if not most, of their phone
calls; some even have replaced their traditional land-line phones with
wireless. Other people send emails or text messages, schedule
appointments, browse the Internet, take pictures, listen to music, and even
shop with their wireless phones. During the last twelve years, the number
of wireless subscribers in the United States has grown from approximately
15 million to over 180 million,' while the annual minutes of use during the
same time period have skyrocketed from below 20 billion to more than 1
trillion.2 This rapid expansion has not been lost on government officials.
As the wireless industry has matured, government officials have
turned to the mobile phone as a way to make the United States safer. E-
911, 3 the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
("CALEA") 4 Wireless Priority Service ("WPS")
5 and Outage Reporting6
1. See Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association, Semi-Annual Wireless
Industry Survey Results at http://www.ctia.org/content/index.cfm/AID/10030 (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).
2. Id.
3. Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-81, 113
Stat. 1286 (1999) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251 (e)(3)). See also Enhance E-911 Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-494, 2004 HR 5410 at § 102(4).
4. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47
U.S.C. §§ 1001-20).
5. The Development of Operation, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting
Federal, State and Local Public Safety Agency Communication Requirements Through the
Year 2010, Establishment of Rules and Requirements for Priority Access Service, First
Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 152 (1998).
6. See New Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to
Communications, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19
F.C.C.R. 16,830 (2004).
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL
all were initiated on the wireless platform in the name of safety. The
Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC") implementation
proceedings for these initiatives have differed markedly. Arguably, the
differing FCC approaches significantly contributed to each initiative's
outcome. Where the FCC fully partnered with industry, as in WPS, the
service was operational in less than one year after being requested by
government officials. Where government moved toward a more command
and control approach, with multiple revisions to the rules, such as in E-911
and CALEA, the services still are not fully implemented. While blame can
be spread across government and industry for the delays with E-911 and
CALEA, an implementation model derived from the successful WPS
approach bears review going forward. In an advanced technology area such
as wireless, government goals may best be achieved by relying on industry
experts as the technology is so sophisticated and constantly developing that
the legislative and regulatory process at times cannot keep pace.
This Article will review wireless Public Safety and Homeland
Security initiatives in three distinct phases. The first, involving CALEA
and E-9 11, represents a phase whereby the FCC would take into
consideration industry concerns and opinions as it moved toward the
ultimate goal of regulation. The second phase, involving WPS and Outage
Reporting, and occurring simultaneously with adoption of the Critical
Infrastructure Information Act ("CIIA"),7 represents a regulatory and
legislative movement to actually replace certain potential regulations with
industry-initiated efforts and private-public partnerships. While not a full
rejection of the first phase "'regulatory mandate" approach, since Outage
Reporting ultimately was mandated, this phase clearly represents a move
by the FCC away from simple regulation and toward industry-government
partnerships. Congress recognized this movement and adopted the CIIA to
facilitate the sharing of information between industry and government.
The third phase currently is underway and involves issues such as
emergency alert services8 and protection of critical infrastructure. 9 As more
Americans carry wireless phones and wireless minutes of use continue to
grow dramatically, and as wireless handset capabilities and networks
continue to expand, the government's focus on wireless service is a
7. See Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-296 (2002)
(codified at 6 U.S.C. §§131-134).
8. ee Amendment of Part 11 of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Emergency
Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 4995 (2004).
9. The telecommunications industry, including the wireless industry, is considered one
of the Nation's critical infrastructures. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
National Response Plan (2005) available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/
editorial/editorial_0566.xml.
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certainty. The key question is what type of regulatory approach the
government will choose for this third phase.
E-911 and CALEA were an attempt by the FCC to regulate the
telecommunication industry regarding very technical issues under difficult
circumstances. The results have been far from perfect. WPS, also involving
a very technical issue, was quickly and successfully implemented. Going
forward, the industry obviously would like to convince the government that
the best path toward achieving the government's wireless goals is to
replicate the WPS model whenever possible.
This Article will explore the evolution of Homeland Security
regulation of the wireless industry. Section II will detail early regulation of
the industry initiated in the name of public interest and safety. Additionally,
Section II will provide a detailed overview of both E-911 and CALEA and
will discuss government actions that arguably delayed deployment of these
initiatives. Section III will explore the evolution from public interest
regulation to Homeland Security regulation after September 11, 2001
("9/11"). One key element of this evolution is government's call for
private-public partnerships. In this phase we see regulators move from
direct regulation of licensees, to a more market-oriented, partnership
approach. Section Il will address Priority Access Services, the FCC's
efforts to monitor service disruptions and report outages to wireless
networks; the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council ("NRIC");
and the CIIA. Section IV will investigate emerging wireless industry
Homeland Security issues, including Emergency Alert Services and the
protection of critical infrastructure. Section IV will also discuss the
regulatory approach that the government should employ. Section V will
conclude that during this time of great uncertainty-in terms of both the
evolution of the wireless industry and the safety and protection of our
country-the trend to partner with the industry to reach government's goals
is sensible and will benefit the American public.
II. PUBLIC INTEREST REGULATION IN THE NAME OF SAFETY
A. Introduction
The wireless issues surrounding CALEA, E-911 services, Priority
Access, and Outage Reporting all emerged from the traditional wireline
environment. The migration to parallel "public interest and homeland
security" requirements and functionalities on the wireless network began
with CALEA and E-9 11. While establishment of both of these regulations
on the wireless platform involved significant input from industry, provision
of CALEA and E-911 never was intended to be voluntary. This Section
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
traces the history of these early regulations from their wireline origins to
the wireless mandate; addresses the elements of the proceedings, including
the multiple FCC proceedings that arguably have led to uncertainty, 0 that
may have contributing to over a decade-long development cycle for both
initiatives. This Section argues that the delay in full deployment of these
services is linked, at least in part, to the regulatory approach that the FCC
chose and the regulatory uncertainty that followed.
B. CALEA
Enacted in 1994, CALEA" codifies the government's ability to obtain
government access to communications systems. 2 Congress wrote CALEA
to extend and clarify the previous obligations of telecommunications
service providers to assist law enforcement with electronic surveillance
orders. 3 CALEA not only preserved the government's existing rights to
10. "Federal and state regulators must remain cognizant that for industries with large
investments in long-lived assets and long cycles for product and service development,
regulatory uncertainty or churn has substantial costs." Leonard J. Kennedy & Heather A.
Purcell, Wandering Along The Road To Competition And Convergence-The Changing
CMRS Roadmap, 56 Fed. Comm. L.J. 489, 550 (2004) (citing Warren G. Lavey, Making
and Keeping Regulatory Promises, 55 Fed. Comm. L.J. 1, 10 (2002)).
11. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in various sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47
U.S.C. §§ 1001-20).
12. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827 at 3489-90. This states that the purpose of CALEA as:
[t]o insure that law enforcement can continue to conduct authorized wiretaps in
the future, the bill requires telecommunications carriers to ensure their systems
have the capability to: (1) isolate expeditiously the content of targeted
communications transmitted by the carrier within the carrier's service area; (2)
isolate expeditiously information identifying the origin and destination of targeted
communications; (3) provide intercepted communications and call identifying
information to law enforcement so they can be transmitted over lines or facilities
leased by law enforcement to a location away from the carrier's premises; and (4)
carry out intercepts unobtrusively, so targets are not made aware of the
interception, and in a manner that does not compromise the privacy and security
of other communications. The bill allows industry to develop standards to
implement these requirements. It establishes a process for the Attorney General to
identify capacity requirements.
Id.
13. In addition to the constitutional Fourth Amendment search and seizure limitations
on government surveillance such as Katz v. United States, telecommunications providers
have been subject to electronic surveillance legislation since 1968. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurrence). Previous legislation includes the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, ("OCCSSA") began as a
check on law enforcement; it stated the procedure by which law enforcement could obtain
an electronic surveillance order. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968). However, later
amendments to the OCCSSA required telecommunication carriers to provide access points
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circuit-switched telecommunications intercept, it also extended law
enforcement's intercept rights to digital and wireless telephony. 4 What
Congress could not have anticipated was that CALEA, would lead to years
of uncertainty and countless FCC and legal proceedings.
1. CALEA Statutory Framework
Section 103 of CALEA requires telecommunications providers' 5 to
ensure that their equipment, facilities, and services adhere to standards that
enable law enforcement to pursue call intercepts, 6 pen registers, 7 and trap
and trace technologies" for surveillance.' 9 The carrier cost for compliance
for intercept.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") authorized federal agencies to
conduct electronic surveillance on a foreign power or agent and extended the budding
obligations of telecommunication service providers. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62. FISA requires
all common carriers to furnish "all information, facilities or technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and
produce a minimum of interference ... " 50 U.S.C. § 1801.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, broadened OCCSSA to include email,
data transmissions, faxes, and pagers. Pub. L. No. 99-506 (1986).
14. See Hildegarde A. Senseney, Interpreting the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994: The Justice Department versus the Telecommunications Industry
and Privacy Rights Advocates, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 665, (1998).
15. CALEA applies to "telecommunications carriers," the term under the statute
includes any "person or entity engaged in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic
communications as a common carrier for hire." 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8) (2000).
16. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CALEA
IMPLEMENTATION UNIT, FLEXIBLE DEPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE GUIDE: FURTHER EXTENSIONS
OF THE JUNE 30, 2004 CALEA ASSISTANCE CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS AND COMPLIANCE
DATES, 4TH ED., May 2004, at 2, available at http://www.askcalea.net/docs/flexguide4.pdf
[hereinafter DEPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE GUIDE] ("The term interception.., refers to the
lawful acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication...
transmitted from one party to another.").
17. DEPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 3 ("The term pen register...
refers to the lawful acquisition of certain outgoing dialing, routing, addressing or signaling
information."). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n. 1 (1979)
A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the
telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not
indicate whether calls are actually completed. A pen register is usually installed at
a central telephone facility and records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from
the line to which it is attached.
Id. (internal citations omitted). While the Smith case explains older technologies used in pen
register devices, the concept is the same. A pen register records outbound information dialed
by the customer and does not record or transmit the contents of a telephone conversation. Id.
18. DEPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 3 ("[T]rap and trace.., refers to
the lawful acquisition of dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably
likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication.").
19. CALEA at §103(a) (excerpted below).
(a) CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS- Except as provided in subsections (b), (c),
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL
with section 103 was capped at $500 million for pre-1995 upgrades;
telecommunications carriers were allocated reimbursement funding to meet
those costs.2" Carriers initially were required to be in compliance with
CALEA by October 25, 1998.21
In addition to mandating access for electronic surveillance, section
103(a)(4) requires that common carriers preserve the privacy of their
customers. Specifically, it commands that common carriers should not
disclose "call-identifying information" that is "not authorized to be
intercepted. 22 Generally, in the mobile environment, if access to call-
identifying information has not been authorized under a subpoena to the
carrier, no information regarding the physical location of the mobile caller
can be provided.23
and (d) of this section and sections 108(a) and 109(b) and (d), a
telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services
that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or
direct communications are capable of-(1) expeditiously isolating and enabling
the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to
intercept, to the exclusion of any other communications, all wire and electronic
communications carried by the carrier within a service area to or from equipment,
facilities, or services of a subscriber of such carrier concurrently with their
transmission to or from the subscriber's equipment, facility, or service, or at such
later time as may be acceptable to the government;
(2) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order
or other lawful authorization, to access call-identifying information that is
reasonably available to the carrier-[Sections 2 (A)-(B) omitted]
(3) delivering intercepted communications and call-identifying information to the
government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, in a format
such that they may be transmitted by means of equipment, facilities, or services
procured by the government to a location other than the premises of the carrier;
and
(4) facilitating authorized communications interceptions and access to call-
identifying information unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with
any subscriber's telecommunications service and in a manner that protects--
(A) the privacy and security of communications and call-identifying information
not authorized to be intercepted; and
(B) information regarding the government's interception of communications and
access to call-identifying information.
20. Center for Democracy and Technology, Status Report on the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act: FBI Seeks to Impose Surveillance Mandates on
Telephone system; Balanced Objectives of 1994 Law Frustrated, Mar. 4, 1999, available at
http://www.cdt.org/digitele/status.htm [hereinafter Status Report on CALEA].
21. CALEAat§1l(b).
22. See CALEA at §103(a)(4)(A); §103(a)(4)(B).
23. Jared J. Nylund, Fire with Fire: How the FBI Set Technical Standards for the
Telecommunications Industry Under CALEA, 8 Comm. L. Conspectus 329, 334 (2000).
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2. Implementation on the Wireless Platform-Partnering Toward a
Mandate
As part of CALEA, Congress delegated to industry organizations the
determination of the initial standards for compliance. 4 The effort to work
with industry on a standard that ultimately would be imbedded in a
mandate highlights the key element of the first phase of public safety
regulation-working with industry toward the goal of regulation. Section
107 of CALEA contains a safe harbor provision that permits carriers to
comply with CALEA simply by following the applicable industry
standard.25 Because of this safe harbor, CALEA appears to be an effort
towards a government-industry partnership.
Two important components of CALEA, however, illustrate that it is
part of this first phase of public interest and public safety regulation and
demonstrate that the Act was not designed to be a truly voluntary industry
initiative, that. First, the absence of a standard created by industry does not
exempt telecommunications carriers from complying with the CALEA
statute.26 With or without a standard, CALEA compliance is mandatory, not
voluntary. Second, the industry safe harbor is subject to FCC review under
section 107(b) of CALEA. z7
24. See CALEA §107(a), 47 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (Supp. 2002).
25. Id. § 1006(a)(2). The section states:
COMPLIANCE UNDER ACCEPTED STANDARDS- A telecommunications
carrier shall be found to be in compliance with the assistance capability
requirements under section 103, and a manufacturer of telecommunications
transmission or switching equipment or a provider of telecommunications support
services shall be found to be in compliance with section 106, if the carrier,
manufacturer, or support service provider is in compliance with publicly available
technical requirements or standards adopted by an industry association or
standard-setting organization, or by the Commission under subsection (b), to meet
the requirements of section 103.
26. Id. § 1006(a)(3).
27. Id. § 1006. This section specifically states:
(b) COMMISSION AUTHORITY- If industry associations or standard-setting
organizations fail to issue technical requirements or standards or if a Government
agency or any other person believes that such requirements or standards are
deficient, the agency or person may petition the Commission to establish, by rule,
technical requirements or standards that-
(1) meet the assistance capability requirements of section 103 by cost-effective
methods;
(2) protect the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be
intercepted;
(3) minimize the cost of such compliance on residential ratepayers;
(4) serve the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new
technologies and services to the public; and
(5) provide a reasonable time and conditions for compliance with and the
transition to any new standard, including defining the obligations of
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
Section 107(b) delegates to the FCC the power to regulate CALEA
compliance if the industry fails to set a standard or upon petition to the
FCC should the industry standard be found insufficient.2" Congress
empowered the FCC to supplant or amend the industry standard to
accomplish the following goals: to meet the compliance requirements of
section 103; to protect the privacy and security of communications; to
minimize cost of compliance to residential ratepayers; to promote new
technologies and services to the public; and to provide a deadline and
compliance conditions during the CALEA transition period. 9 Together, the
fact that the absence of a standard created by industry does not exempt
telecommunications carriers from compliance combined with the ability of
the FCC to review the industry safe harbor clearly reserve control over
industry compliance to the FCC.
a. CALEA, an Industry Standard Initiative?
Shortly after the adoption of CALEA, Telecommunications Industry
Association ("TIA") 30 and Alliance for Telecommunications Industry
Solutions ("ATIS")3 1 established the first CALEA standard.3" Published in
1997, the first version of the standard J-STD-025 ("J Standard") 33 was to
serve as the safe harbor for wireline and wireless providers, as well as
equipment manufacturers, under section 107(a)(2) of CALEA.34 Despite
telecommunications carriers under section 103 during any transition period.
Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Telecommunications Industry Association, Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, at http://www.tiaonline.org/policy/calea/index.cfm and
http://www.tiaonline.org/about/overview (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) [hereinafter TIA]
(stating that TIA is a trade association which represents "providers of communications and
information technology products and services for the global marketplace through its core
competencies in global standards development domestic and international advocacy, as well
as market development and trade promotion programs.").
31. Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions Website, available at
http://www.atis.orgfabout.shtml (stating that the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry
Solutions (ATIS) is a standard setting body, and more than 350 communications companies
participate in the body's 22 industry committees.).
32. TIA, supra note 30 (stating that in early 1995, TIA began the standard setting
process for CALEA compliance through its Engineering Subcommittee TR-45.2).
33. Press Release, Telecommunications Industry Association, TIA and ATIS Publish
Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance Industry Standard (Dec. 5, 1997) at
http://www.tiaonline.orglpubs/press-releases/1997/97-96.cfm.
34. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling, 19 F.C.C.R. 15,676,
paras. 12-13 (2004) [hereinafter CALEA 2004 NPRM]
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the joint industry effort, the FBI strongly objected, which became the basis
for a lengthy ongoing regulatory and legal battle. From this point forward,
the industry no longer had full control of the standard-setting process, as
the FCC entered the process under the role reserved to it in section 107(b)
of CALEA.
b. Law Enforcement Seeks to Revise the Industry Standard
Although TIA and ATIS rewrote the standard to comply with the
FBI's requirements in many respects, the FBI was not fully satisfied.35 As a
result, while the J Standard ultimately was adopted, it was merely an
interim standard.36 The FBI, along with thirty-five law enforcement
agencies, soon shared their concerns regarding the J Standard with the
FCC.37 The FBI's multiple objections to the standard and the FCC's efforts
to address those concerns began a cycle of law enforcement objections and
FCC proceedings that arguably significantly impacted the timing of full
CALEA implementation.
The first series of FBI objections concerned the extension of the
October 1998 compliance deadlines. In a series of comments, the FBI
objected to the requests of carriers, such as AT&T Wireless,3" Bell South
Cellular,39 and US West, Inc., n° to extend the October 1998 CALEA
compliance deadlines n.4  The FBI argued that CALEA does not permit
35. Status Report on CALEA, supra note 20.
36. Id.
37. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Comments of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation Regarding Implementation of the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, CC Dkt. No. 97-213 (1997). This first comment was
submitted one month after the J Standard was published. It merely stated that the current
standards process was ongoing and it was inappropriate to specifically comment on the
standard at that time. Id. See also Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,
Reply Comments of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Regarding Implementation of the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, CC Dkt. No. 97-213 (1998),
available at http://www.askcalea.net/docs/980211.pdf [hereinafter 1998 FBI Reply
Comments].
38. See, e.g., Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Comments of
AT&T Wireless, CC Docket No. 97-213 (1998).
39. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Comments of Bell South
Cellular, CC Docket No. 97-213 (1998).
40. See, e.g., Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Comments of U.S.
West, Inc., CC Dkt. No. 97-213 (1998). See also, 1998 FBI Reply Comments, available at
http://www.askcalea.net/docs/98021 I.pdf (providing that the FBI was particularly opposed
to U.S. West's reading of the statute. U.S. West argued that section 107(c), the extension
provision of the statue, "does not limit the Commission's authority to granting extensions
based on individual carrier petitions.").
41. Carriers were asking for a two-year extension to October 24, 2000. They pointed to
many reasons for the necessity of a compliance extension, including equipment difficulties,
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industry-wide deadline extensions.42 Even with the FBI's objections, the
FCC eventually extended CALEA compliance until June 30, 2000.41 This
extension did not come without controversy. In addition to opposing the
extensions, the FBI also requested a series of CALEA standard capabilities
not incorporated in TIA's J Standard." Thus, the voluntarily developed
industry-driven standard was going to be revised by the government.
A little more than a month after the FBI filed Reply Comments in
1998, it issued its "Punch List" of specific technical requirements to be
included in the J Standard. These requirements were listed in a Joint
Petition for Expedited Rulemaking filed by the FBI and the Department of
Justice,45 under section 107 (b) of the CALEA, which allows that "if a
and roving standards, to name a few. See e.g., Petition for Extension of the Compliance Date
under section 107 of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, ICG
Telecom Group, Inc. Petition for Extension and Comments, CC Docket No. 97-213 (1998)
(providing that ICG cited difficulties in obtaining CALEA compliant equipment as the
thrust of its extension petition. In fact, ICG's primary vendor, Lucent Technologies, Inc.,
filed a CALEA extension petition as well. ICG argued that it couldn't possibly be compliant
if its vendor was doubtful of compliance); Petition for an Extension of the CALEA
Assistance Capability Compliance Date of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, Air Touch Paging, Inc., Petition for an Extension of the CALEA
Assistance Capability Compliance Date, CC Docket No. 97-213 (1998) (providing that
AirTouch Paging originally thought its clone paging system was compliant with CALEA.
However, it stated that the FBI in 1998 changed its position and stated that clone pagers
were not compliant with the statute. AirTouch states that the FBI found them in compliance
as early as December 1997). In addition to these and many other named carriers, trade
associations, such as CTIA, TIA, and the Personal Communications Industry Association
also commented on the proceeding. The FBI would later comment that trade associations do
not have administrative standing to participate in a time extension request. 1998 FBI Reply
Comments, supra note 37, paras. 7-8.
42. See 1998 FBI Reply Comments, supra note 37, paras. 7-13.
43. See Petition for the Extension of the Compliance Date Under Section 107 of the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act by AT&T Wireless Services, Inc,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 432 (1998), available at
http:l/ftp.fcc.gov/BureauslWireless/Ordersl1998/fcc98223.pdf [hereinafter AT&T Petition
Opinion and Order]. After the 1998 extension, the Commission extended the compliance
deadline twice. The most recent extension period expired on January 1, 2004; see notes for a
discussion of the most recent NPRM (explaining that the current NPRM has tentatively
concluded that blanket extensions will not be granted).
44. 1998 FBI Reply Comments, supra note 37, paras. 55-91 (providing that CALEA
compliance improvement items included extending civil liabilities to carriers whose
employees unlawfully intercept communications, requiring carriers to designate specific
personnel to CALEA matters, requiring adequate recordkeeping, assistance affidavits for
carrier personnel, employee violation reporting procedures, timeliness requirements for
intercept requests, and certification of CALEA requirement for all carriers).
45. Establishment of Technical Requirements and Standards for Telecommunications
Carrier Assistance Capabilities under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act, Joint Petition for Expedited Rulemaking (1998) available at http://www.askcalea.net/
docs/980327.pdf [hereinafter Punch List Petition].
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Government agency or any other person believes that such requirements or
standards are deficient, the agency or person may petition the FCC to
establish, by rule, technical requirements or standards."46 The Joint Petition
sought the following requirements to cure the perceived J Standard
deficiencies:
Access to the communications of all parties in a conference call
supported by the subscriber's service or facilities; -Access to all
subject-initiated dialing and signaling activity; -Information indicating
whether a party is connected to a multi-party call at any given time
("party hold," "party join," and "party drop" messages); -Notification
of messages for in-band and out-of-band signaling; -Timely delivery of
call-identifying information; -Automated reporting of surveillance
status; -Delivery of all call-identifying information over call data
channels; and-A limited number of standardized delivery interfaces.47
The Center for Democracy and Technology estimated that the FBI
wish list would increase compliance costs from $500 million to between $3
and $5 billion.4" In addition to the proposed "punch list" changes, the FBI
sought to shift the total cost of compliance to carriers.49 These proposed
changes and looming cost recovery issues added to the uncertainty
surrounding CALEA.
The FCC's resultant third Report and Order held that six of the
"punch list" items were within the scope of CALEA call-identifying
information." Specifically, packet mode communications capabilities5' and
location information 51 capabilities were required to be part of the J
46. See CALEA at § 107(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1006 (b)).
47. Punch List Petition, supra note 45, para. 35.
48. STATUS REPORT ON CALEA, supra note 20.
49. Id. See also Punch List Petition, supra note 45, para. 112 (recognizing that the
Commission had previously issued a rulemaking proceeding on the subject of cost
recovery).
50. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Third Report and Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 16,794, paras. 74, 82, 89, 95, 119 (1999) available at http://www.askcalea.coml
docs/fcc99230.pdf (providing that the following capabilities were required to be included in
the J Standard: party hold/join/drop information, subject-initiated dialing and signaling
information, in-band and out-of-band signaling that constitutes call-identifying information,
a timing information requirement, and digits dialed after connecting to a carrier also
constitute call identifying information).
51. CALEA 2004 NPRM, supra note 34, para. 14 n.24 ("Section 3 of the J Standard
describes packet-mode as a 'communication where individual packets or virtual circuits of a
communication within a physical circuit are switched or routed by accessing [a]
telecommunication[s] system. Each packet may take a different route through the
intervening network(s).').
52. Id. para. 14 n.25
The J Standard includes a parameter that identifies the location of a subject's
"mobile terminal" whenever this information is reasonably available and its
delivery to a LEA [law enforcement agency] is legally authorized. Location
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Standard. This Order further illustrated the government's control over the
CALEA standard process.
Carriers immediately were concerned that traditional dividing lines
securing certain consumers' communications could not translate into
packet-based communications under the new CALEA requirements. 3 If
law enforcement intercepted packets from a wireless customer, those
packets would contain both location information, in the header of the
packet, as well as call content in the payload segments of the packet. 4 If
law enforcement did not obtain a full call intercept warrant, the government
could obtain greater information than it was legally authorized to access.
Law enforcement in this instance could be engaging in an unlawful search
contrary to the statute and legal precedent.55 TIA noted that with packet-
based technologies the "responsibility [is] on the [law enforcement agent]
to retain only the authorized information. ,,56 Carriers eventually
petitioned the D.C. Circuit for relief of the packet mode requirements, the
location information capabilities, and four other "punch list"
information is available to the LEA irrespective of whether a call content channel
or a call data channel is employed.
Id.
53. Betsy Harter, CALEA Irks Carriers, WIRELESS REvIEW, Oct. 1, 1999, available at
http://wirelessreview.com/ar/wireless-calea-irkscarriers.
54. Joint Experts Meeting convened by Committee TR 45 of the Telecommunications
Industry Association, Report to the Federal Communications Commission on Surveillance
of Packet-Mode Technologies, (Sept. 29, 2000) available at http://www.tiaonline.org/
govemment/filings/JEMRptFinal_092900.pdf [hereinafter TIA Report]. The Report
stated:
Currently J-STD-025 specifies delivery of the entire packet stream or just the
Source and Destination address information for a user under surveillance. While
delivery of the entire packet stream guarantees that authorized Pen Register and
Trap and Trace information will be delivered to the LEA, it does not remove
content prior to delivery.
55. Ordinarily, a LEA is required to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause prior
to the grant of an intercept order. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (overruling the
trespass doctrine of Olmstead v. United States and holding that FBI agents conducted a
Fourth Amendment search when they attached an electronic listening device to a telephone
booth); contra Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that a pen register does not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search, and as such a warrant is not required for the
conduct). Note that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA") does
require law enforcement to obtain a certification for a pen register. However, this pen
register order only requires a law enforcement officer to certify that "the information likely
to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2));
see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(h) (stating that a pen register is not an unlawful intercept under
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968). As such, an LEA
could request a pen register which does not have a warrant requirement, and possibly
receive call content.
56. TIA Report, supra note 54, at 15.
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requirements.57
c. The "Partnership" Moves to the Courtroom
What began as an industry-government partnership ultimately moved
to the courtroom, as the uncertainty surrounding CALEA compliance grew.
The United States Telecom Association ("USTA") and other petitioners
sued in the D.C. Circuit seeking a review of the Third Report and Order
and a limitation on expansion of CALEA requirements.5" In particular, the
petitioners questioned the legality of the packet-mode capability
requirement,59 the location information requirement, 60 and four of the six
"punch list" items.6' The court vacated the "four punch" list items in part;
however, the FCC, in an Order on Remand, found that CALEA mandated
all punch list capabilities. 62 The Order on Remand was not appealed again
by USTA or any other telecommunications provider or association.63 As
such, all six "punch list" items became part of the CALEA requirements.
This regulatory action provided further evidence that the "safe harbor"
review process was not part of a voluntary industry-government
partnership; but rather part of a traditional industry mandate.
3. Packet-Based Implementation, Location Information, and Cost
Concerns Add to the Uncertainty
Although in the intervening years some of the wireless industry's
concerns were addressed-including the creation by the FBI of a Flexible
Deployment Program for compliance with the CALEA standards and
57. CALEA 2004 NPRM, supra note 34, para. 15 n.30 (providing that carriers
challenged the following punch list requirements in addition to the location information and
packet mode requirements: "dialed digit extraction, party hold/join/drop, subject initiated
dialing and signaling, and in band and out-of-band signaling.").
58. United States Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC (USTA), 227 F.3d 450, 450 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
59. Id. at 464 (providing that the packet mode capability requirement dealt with the
inability to separate packet location information in its header from call content in the packet
payload).
60. Id. (discussing that the location information provision required wireless carriers to
make available the physical location of the nearest antenna tower at the beginning and end
of each call. CDT stated that this requirement effectively "converts ordinary mobile
telephones into personal location-tracking devices ... ").
61. Id. at 456 (providing that petitioners challenged dialed digit extraction, party
hold/join/drop, subject initiated dialing and signaling, and in-band and out-of-band
signaling).
62. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, CC Docket No. 97-213,
Order on Remand, 17 F.C.C.R. 6896 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Order on Remand]. See also,
CALEA 2004 NPRM, supra note 34, para. 15.
63. CALEA 2004 NPRM, supra note 34, para. 15
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extended compliance deadlines pertaining to packet-mode petitions-much
continues to remain uncertain regarding CALEA compliance.' This
uncertainty is due both to the technical complexity of the issue as well as
the multiple changes to the standard and the rules.65 This uncertainty
continues. Despite close to a decade of regulatory inquiry, a 2004 Joint
Petition identified thirteen issues regarding CALEA.66
The FCC responded with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Declaratory Ruling ("CALEA 2004 NPRM") that once again raised a host
of new issues surrounding CALEA compliance. 67 In addition to addressing
64. DEPLOYMENT AssISTANCE GUIDE, supra note 16 (explaining that the FCC
established a deadline for packet-mode communications compliance which is January 30,
2004). See also Wireline Competition and Wireless Telecommunications Bureaus Announce
a Revised Schedule for Consideration of Pending Packet Mode CALEA Section 107(c)
Petitions and Related Issues, Public Notice, 18 F.C.C.R. 24,243 (2003)
65. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug
Enforcement Administration Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve Various Outstanding
Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, Joint Petition for Expedited Rulemaking (2004) available at
http://www.askcalea.net/docs/200403l0.calea.jper.pdf [hereinafter 2004 Joint Petition].
66. Id. at iii. The Joint Petition asked the Commission to:
(1) formally identify the types of services and entities that are subject to CALEA;
(2) formally identify the services that are considered "packet-mode services";
(3) initially issue a Declaratory Ruling or other formal Commission statement, and
ultimately adopt final rules, finding that broadband access services and broadband
telephony services are subject to CALEA;
(4) reaffirm, consistent with the Commission's finding in the CALEA Second
Report and Order, that push-to-talk "dispatch" service is subject to CALEA;
(5) adopt rules that provide for the easy and rapid identification of future CALEA-
covered services and entities;
(6) establish benchmarks and deadlines for CALEA packet-mode compliance;
(7) adopt rules that provide for the establishment of benchmarks and deadlines for
CALEA compliance with future CALEA-covered technologies;
(8) outline the criteria for extensions of any benchmarks and deadlines for
compliance with future CALEA-covered technologies established by the
Commission;
(9) establish rules to permit it to request information regarding CALEA
compliance generally;
(10) establish procedures for enforcement action against entities that do not
comply with their CALEA obligations;
(11) confirm that carriers bear sole financial responsibility for CALEA
implementation costs for post-January 1, 1995 communications equipment,
facilities and services;
(12) permit carriers to recover their CALEA implementation costs from their
customers; and
(13) clarify the cost methodology and financial responsibility associated with
intercept provisioning.
Id.
67. CALEA 2004 NPRM, supra note 34.
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push-to-talk services and packet mode technologies,68 the FCC questioned
threshold service definitions, CALEA extensions, and cost recovery.69
Throughout the proceeding, as the FCC addressed certain issues, it
often raised additional questions that continued the march toward a
traditional mandate. For example, the threshold question of how to define
for regulatory purposes whether certain carriers are "telecommunications
carriers" under the statute and thus subject to the CALEA is now--eleven
years after its enactment-being considered by the industry and the FCC.
The CALEA 2004 NPRM tentatively concludes that facilities-based
providers of broadband telephony are subject to CALEA's requirements as
is any non-facilities-based provider that constitutes a substantial
replacement of wire services, including wireless carriers.7"
a. Compliance Issues
Many compliance questions also remain. First, the inclusion of
location information or call identifying information in any data retrieved by
government persists as a concern to carriers.7 The FCC previously
determined that, per CALEA, call identifying information was not limited
to telephone numbers; therefore, mobile service providers could include the
physical locations of antenna towers used to connect the call.72 In the
CALEA 2004 NPRM, the FCC realized that the location information for
the packet may not be reasonably identifiable without examining the
packet's content.73 The FCC also sought comment on what call-identifying
information is considered reasonably available per section 103(a)(2) of the
CALEA.74 These questions add to the level of uncertainty surrounding
compliance with the CALEA requirements, and if past experience is any
indication of future action, additional regulatory or legal proceedings are
likely to follow.
b. Deadline Extensions
In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC also considered the
subject of CALEA deadline extensions. Perhaps due in part to the multiple
68. Id. at 3. (describing CALEA as being technology neutral).
69. 2002 Order on Remand, supra note 62.
70. Id. para. 37. Note, that CALEA Notice on Proposed Rule Making does explore non-
facilities-based telephony providers, however this Article is limited to a discussion of issues
facing the wireless carrier.
71. Id. paras. 63-68.
72. Id. para. 64.
73. Id. para. 65.
74. Id. paras. 66-67 (listing the three types of call-identifying information provided by
the Act).
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
changes in the CALEA requirements, extensions continue to flow into the
FCC. Over 750 CALEA extension petitions were filed prior to June 30,
2004.7' The FCC voiced support for tightening extension deadlines and
tentatively concluded that ninety days is a reasonable period of time to
comply with CALEA's requirements. 76 The FCC also sought comment on
whether the FBI program should function as a barometer of what is
reasonably achievable under section 107(c) of the CALEA.77
c. Enforcement Regime
Surprisingly, the CALEA 2004 NPRM also sought comment on
additional threshold issues, including the appropriate enforcement regime
for CALEA petitions.78 The 2004 Joint Petition asked the FCC specifically
to outline the enforcement actions that need to be taken against carriers and
equipment manufacturers. 79 The FCC sought comment on whether it may
take separate enforcement action against- carriers and manufacturers that
fail to comply with CALEA. °
d. Cost Recovery
Finally, cost recovery issues have been raised by the FCC. The FCC
recognized that CALEA required capital expenditures and continuing
expenses by the wireless community.8' Law enforcement argued that the
burden of CALEA cost should be placed on the carriers and not the local
law enforcement agencies ("LEAs"). s2 The 2004 CALEA NPRM identified
75. Id. para. 90. (Since then, the Commission has received an additional 330 new §
107(c) extension petitions). The Commission also recognized that some cariers are actively
negotiating with the FBI through its Flexible Deployment Program. Under the FBI's
Flexible Deployment program, a carrier provides the agency with all of its information
regarding the switches in its network and the carriers' most recent surveillance assistance
activity. With this data, the FBI will attempt to negotiate a mutual deployment schedule with
the carrier. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Ask CALEA
Website, Flexible Deployment, available at http://www.askcalea.net/flexd.html (last visited
May 18, 2005).
76. CALEA 2004 NPRM, supra note 34 at para. 91 (providing that the Commission also
leaves open the possibility that individual carriers may be seeking relief from the CALEA
requirements).
77. Id. para. 93.
78. Id. paras. 111-116. See also 47 U.S.C § 1007 (stating the current civil suit remedy
for CALEA enforcement).
79. 2004 Joint Petition, supra note 65, at 58.
80. See, e.g., CALEA 2004 NPRM, supra note 34, para. 113.
81. Id. para. 117.
82. 2004 Joint Petition, supra note 65, at 64. See also 2004 CALEA NPRM, supra note
34, para. 123 n.295.
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that CALEA section 109 provides for three cost recovery mechanisms.83 As
for equipment modifications prior to 1995, the federal government bears
the costs for those upgrades; where it does not bear the cost, those pre-1995
facilities are considered CALEA compliant until the equipment or facilities
are modified. 4
The FCC tentatively concluded that carriers are responsible for
equipment and facilities developed after January 1, 1995.85 The FCC,
however, sought comment on whether specific rules are necessary to
determine the carrier's compliance CoSt. 86 In addition to questions
regarding reimbursement for modification of facilities, there also are
questions regarding intercept-related costs. 87 Generally, LEAs must
compensate wireless providers for specific intercept-related costs. 88 Law
enforcement argues the government is charged twice for CALEA
compliance. The LEA argument states that by including intercept costs,
carriers are able to recover costs for hardware and software for post
January 1995 equipment.89 Additionally, the LEAs argued in their petition
that the intercept-related costs improperly shifted the CALEA cost burden
to the government when the government already provided funds for pre-
1995 upgrades. 90
In essence, the 2004 Joint Petition and the CALEA 2004 NPRM
represent over a decade of shifting toward a traditional mandatory
regulation and away from the initial government-industry partnership. This
movement is illustrative of the first phase of public safety and Homeland
Security regulation. The CALEA safe harbor J Standard was developed to
allow industry to adapt a compliant solution. Uncertainty, however, has
been the norm since the establishment of that original standard. Actions by
the government, including the most recent conclusions regarding
83. 2004 CALEA NPRM, supra note 34, para. 125.
(1) the costs of developing the modifications for equipment deployed on or before
January 1, 1995, (2) the costs of providing the capabilities for equipment deployed
after January 1, 1995, but only where the Commission finds compliance is not
"reasonably achievable" and (3) the costs of providing the "capabilities" required
under section 104 of CALEA....
Id. The NPRM identifies that the costs of providing the capabilities is not at issue. Id. The
D.C. circuit addressed the third issue in United States Telecomm. Ass'n v. FBI, 276 F.3d
620 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
84. 2004 CALEA NPRM, supra note 34, para. 125.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. paras. 132-35.
88. Id. para. 132.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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extensions and cost recovery, will continue the uncertainty. This ten-year
process is a strong example of the lack of an effective government-industry
partnership. Unfortunately, in this first phase of public safety and
Homeland Security regulation, CALEA is not the only example of an
ineffective partnership that ultimately led to delay.
C. E-911: To Partner or to Regulate?
1. Introduction
Uncertainty, confusion, and changes in the FCC's rules are not
exclusive to CALEA. Working with industry on elements of compliance
with a government mandate also is not exclusive to CALEA. Each of these
CALEA experiences arose in the E-911 proceeding. Accordingly, the result
for E-9 11 development and deployment is not unlike the result in CALEA.
Countless regulatory and legal proceedings combined with significant
uncertainty, resulted in a proceeding that is over ten years old. The
proceeding illustrates the difficulties regulators encounter in trying to
address the uncertainty of implementing mandates that involve new
communications technologies. 91
The path that the E-911 proceeding has taken over the last decade
obviously is not a model for future industry-government partnerships, even
though the proceeding arose from a general industry consensus that E-911
wireless services were needed. Despite the industry origins, the FCC
decided that ultimately it was going to mandate the E-9 11 requirement. The
question that arose during the initial phase of the proceeding was to what
extent regulatory intervention was necessary.92
Consistent with this phase of public safety regulation, the FCC
initially relied on the ability of industry and public safety groups to develop
the E-911 rules and regulations. The FCC imposed E-911 rules based
91. Warren G. Lavey, Making and Keeping Regulatory Promises, 55 Fed. Comm. L.J.
1, 39-40 (2002). "While regulators control access charges and universal funding
mechanisms, they do not control, and often have poor visibility into, technological
developments for some new services for a group of licensed carriers also involving
equipment suppliers, interconnected carriers, and other non-carrier entities that play roles in
provisioning the services. Repeated rule changes and recent waivers in this proceeding point
to the fine line between enforceable commitments and nonenforceable statements of
intentions." Id.
92. See Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal
Communications Services, Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700, paras. 139-140
(1993) [hereinafter Second Report and Order]. See also Revision of the Commission's
Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 18,676, paras. 21, 61
(1996) [hereinafter First E-911 Report and Order].
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largely upon a framework developed by representatives of the wireless
industry and public safety organizations in a Consensus Agreement.93 The
Consensus Agreement had a profound impact on shaping the regulation of
E-91 1. As with CALEA, the FCC retained a significant regulatory role in
the development and deployment of E-911.
To a large extent the FCC, in implementing rules for the development
of E-91 1, addressed Commissioner Kathleen Abernathy's suggestion that
when regulating in a rapidly changing technological environment, the FCC
should be eager "to reach out to a broad array of groups to maximize the
information available to decision makers. 94 As stated above, the regulation
of wireless E-911 was initially shaped by early industry-government
partnerships.95 The FCC's rigidity in applying certain aspects of this
agreement,96 as well as multiple revisions to the rules-at times at the
request of the wireless industry-has created uncertainty for the industry,
arguably hampering deployment. 97 Further, the FCC's attempts to adopt
strict timetables based on vendor representations and in the face of rapid
technological change arguably also impacted deployment of E-9 11, instead
93. First E-911 Report and Order at paras. 21, 61.
94. Kathleen Q. Abernathy, My View From the Doorstep of FCC Change, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 199, 218 (2002).
95. See e.g., First E-911 Report and Order, supra note 92. See also Revision of the
Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with E-911 Emergency Calling Systems,
Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 20,850, para. 1 (1999) [hereinafter
Second E-911 Report and Order] (The Commission adopted E-9 11 rules in accordance with
an agreement between the wireless industry and State and local 911 officials.).
96. See Second E-911 Report and Order, supra note 95 (discussing the Commission's
enforcement measures regarding the timetable for E-91 1 deployment.).
97. See discussion of the Commission's decision to eliminate the cost-recovery
requirement as it pertains to wireless carriers infra Part II.C.3.c. See also Revision of the
Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling
Systems, Comments of Western Wireless Corporation and VoiceStream Wireless
Corporation, CC Dkt. No. 94-102, at 2 (1999), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/
ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native or pdf=pdf&id.document=6009451135 ("The initial obstacle in
providing E-911 service is the lack of cost recovery legislation signed into law in many
states."); Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Systems, Comments of APCO in Response to Public Notice of August
16, 1999, CC Dkt. No. 94-102, at 3 (1999), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/
ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native or pdf=pdf&iddocument=6009451133 ("In particular, the
extremely slow pace of cost-recovery legislation has been the principal impediment to
implementing the Commission's E9-1-1 rules."); Revision of the Commission's Rules to
Ensure Compatibility With Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, Comments of the
Rural Telecommunications Group, CC Dkt. No. 94-102, at 2 (1999), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&iddocument=600945062
5 ("The absence of federal guidelines regarding the scope of recoverable costs makes the
task of establishing procedures for collecting fees and distributing proceeds even more
difficult. To accelerate implementation.. .the Commission [should] adopt uniform federal
guidelines to guide the states in adopting cost recovery mechanisms.").
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of creating market certainty as the FCC had hoped.98
2. Delivering E-9 11 Service in a Wireless Environment
a. Background
Basic 911 service routes emergency calls to Public Safety Answering
Points ("PSAPs").99 When a 911 call is placed by a wireline customer, the
phone number is identified through Automatic Number Identification
("ANI") technology and that number is matched to a database listing the
corresponding address."° The call is then routed by the Local Exchange
Carrier ("LEC") to the nearest PSAP.1°  This constitutes wireline ALI. E-
911 requires delivery of two elements. The first element is ANI, the second
is Automatic Location Identification ("ALI"). 10 2
For the wireless industry, the process and rules for satisfying E-911
requirements differ from those of the wireline industry. The ANI
requirements for wireless require the carrier to provide both the number of
the wireless user and the location of the cell site or base station."°3 The ALl
rules for wireless carriers require the carrier to provide the physical
location of the caller by longitude and latitude." ALI is important both for
allowing PSAPs to identify to a certain degree the location of a caller,
105and for making sure that local wireline carriers route calls to the nearest
PSAPs with greater accuracy than can be attained by merely using ANI."
The minimum standard of accuracy for wireless ALl is dependant on
the type of technology used by the carrier." As the industry and the FCC
have learned, developing E-911 service in a wireless environment produces
98. See infra Part II.C.2.b.
99. Revision of the Commissions Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 9 F.C.C.R. 6170, para. 5
(1994).
100. Id. para. 4.
101. Id.
102. First E-911 Report and Order, supra note 92, paras. 4-5.
103. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(d)(1) (2002).
104. Id. §20.18(e).
105. Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Systems, Third Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 17,388, para. 2 (1999)
[hereinafter Third E-911 Report and Order].
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1)-(2).
[N]etwork-based ALI carriers must determine the caller's location within 300
meters 95 percent of the time and 100 meters 67 percent of the time....
[H]andset-based ALl carriers must determine the caller's location within 150
meters 95 percent of the time and 50 meters 67 percent of the time.
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distinct challenges from wireline E-911,108 presented primarily in delivery
of ALI functionality. The FCC, working initially with both industry and
public safety groups, divided the deployment of E-911 services into two
phases. Phase I consisted of the deployment of ANI functionality,while
Phase II consisted of the deployment of ALI functionality." ° While there
were some troubles implementing Phase I of the E-911 mandate," 0 most of
the disputes and uncertainty has centered on the development and
satisfaction of Phase II requirements. "
b. Location Identification Alternatives
In its Rules, the FCC did not mandate a particular ALl location solution for
delivery of Phase II. Under the original E-911 plan adopted by the FCC, the
wireless carriers had to use network-based ALI to meet their Phase I
requirements."' However, after a revision of the initial rules, wireless
carriers were able to choose either a handset-based or network-based
solution." 3 Handset-based ALl would utilize GPS and similar location
technologies," 4 while network-based ALI would use triangulation of the
mobile signal and similar technologies." 5
Both solutions have benefits and concerns attached. In urban areas,
for example, a network-based solution may make more sense to some
wireless carriers as the concentration of cellular towers in those areas
makes triangulation easier." 6 For rural areas, triangulation utilizing cell
sites could require massive investment in new infrastructure to
accommodate triangulation technologies.' There are similar benefits and
problems with use of a handset-based solution. . These issues are just two
of the many that have been raised in this proceeding, highlighting E-911,
108. First E-911 Report and Order, supra note 92, para. 7 ("[T]he nature of wireless
technology and service presents significant obstacles to making E-911 effective for wireless
calls.").
109. Dale N. Hatfield, A REPORT ON TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES IMPACTING
THE PROVISION OF WIRELESS ENHANCED 911 SERVICES 10-11, available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=651329623
9 [hereinafter HATFIELD REPORT].
110. Second E-911 Report and Order, supra note 95, para. 16.
111. See infra Part 1.3.
112. Third E-911 Report and Order, supra note 105, para. 2.
113. See, e.g., id. (revising the FCC Phase II requirements to allow competition between
network-based and handset-based technologies and to make Phase II benchmarks for ALl
more stringent based on the technological advances that had occurred between the issuing of
the first E-91 I order and the third E-91 1 order).
114. HATFIELD REPORT, supra note 109, at 10-11.
115. Id. at 10.
116. Id. at 12.
117. Id.
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along with CALEA, as being part of the first phase of public safety
regulation.
3. Regulating a Consensus
a. The Role of the Consensus Agreement in Shaping E-911
Regulation
As in the early stages of the CALEA proceeding, "the Commission
imposed E-911 rules ... based largely upon a framework developed by
representatives of the wireless industry and public safety organizations in a
Consensus Agreement.""' 8 From the industry's perspective, the FCC's
effort to partner with wireless carriers in the development of regulations
initially was beneficial. However, while the Consensus Agreement had a
profound impact on shaping the regulation of E-91 1,"' the FCC, as it did
with CALEA, obviously carved out a role for the regulator as the final
arbiter of what elements would be binding and which parts would be
modified or eliminated. 2 '
The FCC's approach to E-911 could be described as an attempt at
goals-based partnership toward regulation. That is, the regulator established
goals and minimum standards, while not initially mandating any specific
method or practice for achieving those goals and standards. This regulatory
method was illustrated in the FCC's decision to revise the Phase II
requirements to allow for handset-based ALI technologies.' 2'
The same approach held when establishing a deadline for compliance.
The FCC followed the recommendations of the Consensus Agreement.'22
While deadlines were set, the methods for meeting the timelines were not
specified. Rather, wireless carriers, LECs and PSAPs were left to develop
systems that would meet the requirements for each phase by specified
dates.2 3 The FCC determined that by remaining "technologically and
competitively neutral,"'' 24 they would encourage parties to "arrive at a
118. Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Systems, Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 22,810
para. 2 (2000).
119. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2002).
120. See e.g., First E-911 Report and Order, supra note 92.
121. See, e.g., Third E-911 Report and Order, supra note 105.
122. See First E-911 Report and Order, supra note 92, paras. 61-72.
123. Id.
124. WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION 2004 BIENNIAL REGULATORY REVIEW §20 (2005), available at http://hraunfoss.
fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-05-20AI .pdf [hereinafter 2004 BIENNIAL REVIEW].
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solution that is both effective and cost-efficient." '125
This attempt at partnership was abandoned, to some extent, when the
first problems arose.' 26 When carriers failed to meet their obligations under
Phase II, the FCC used the possibility of an enforcement action to obtain
consent decrees. The consent decrees bind the carriers to a revised Phase II
deployment schedule and require the carriers to issue quarterly reports on
their progress in meeting these goals.127
b. The Cost-Recovery Problem
As with CALEA, the FCC made additional changes to its rules during
development and deployment of the E-911 solution that arguable slowed
completion of the service. One area was cost recovery. The FCC initially
required that a mechanism be in place to allow wireless carriers to recover
adequate costs before deploying E-911 services.128 When the FCC reviewed
its original E-911 order, it relied on the parties to the Consensus
Agreement, who filed a joint status report, in assessing what progress had
been made.'29 The findings of the report led the FCC to conclude, among
other things, that the cost-recovery requirement was an impediment to a
timely roll-out of E-91 L."' The FCC believed that removing the cost-
recovery requirement was necessary to eliminate uncertainty in the
market.131
The cost-recovery requirement mandated that provision of Phase I and
Phase II services was preconditioned on the development of a mechanism
for both wireless carriers and PSAPs to recover costs associated with
deployment.'32 The FCC maintained the cost-recovery requirement for
PSAPs,'3 3 but after further review, removed the requirement as a
prerequisite for wireless carrier provision of E-911 service.3  As the FCC
explained, they faced an "either/or" proposition.' 35 Either they get involved
125. Id.
126. See Second Report and Order, supra note 92; 2004 BIENNIAL REVIEW, supra note
124, at §20 ("Where major carriers fell behind schedule or requested additional time, the
Commission negotiated consent decrees which provided penalties for failure to comply and
set specific enforceable future Phase II deployment schedules.").
127. See e.g., AT&T Wireless, Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 19,938 (2002); T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 15,123 (2003).
128. See First E-911 Report and Order, supra note 92, paras. 85-90.
129. See, e.g., Second E-911 Report and Order, supra note 95. para. 16.
130. Id. para. 18.
131. Id. paras. 43-50.
132. See First E-911 Report and Order, supra note 92, paras. 85-90.
133. See Second E-911 Report and Order, supra note 95, para. 65.
134. See id.
135. Id. para. 39 ("In order to move E-911 implementation forward, it appears that we
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in regulating the specifics of a cost-recovery mechanism or they eliminate
the cost-recovery mechanism in its entirety. 36 They chose elimination.
The original rules served as a guarantee to wireless carriers that they
would not have to fund, or pass through to customers, significant costs
associated with infrastructure investments. It was widely acknowledged
that the cost-recovery requirement was intended to mimic the systems in
place for wireline E-911 providers. 37 However, the FCC found that
because wireless carriers are not rate-regulated 3 8 there was no need for
cost-recovery mechanisms. This distinction was determinative in the FCC's
ruling to eliminate the cost-recovery requirement. While the FCC's
decision was supported by the courts, 3 9 the fight over cost-recovery, and
other changes made by the FCC during over thirty E-911-related
proceedings,"4 added to the uncertainty surrounding the service, and
devalued the initial agreement forged between the industry, public safety,
and government.
The ongoing CALEA and E-911 proceedings highlight the difficulties
with trying to regulate a technical issue that originally was designed as an
industry-government partnership. These proceedings also underscore the
problems that develop when rules are changed during development and
deployment of a service. At a minimum, this phase of public safety
regulation provides an example of how even the best of regulatory
intentions can hamper deployment of a service. These precedents obviously
have, and will continue, to impact the approach to government intervention
in homeland security and public safety proceedings, and can serve as a
foundation against which all other proceedings in this area are measured.
must either adopt a much more detailed definition of a cost recovery mechanism or delete
that condition from the rule.").
136. Id.
137. Id. para. 27 ("Public Safety Associations agree with CTIA and the carriers that, as
reflected in the Consensus Agreement, the parties intended to pursue publicly-adopted
surcharges similar to those often used for wireline 911 .... ).
138. Id. para. 61. ("This is [self-recovery] the normal way that costs of doing business,
including the costs of complying with government-imposed requirements, are recovered in
an industry free of rate regulation." [emphasis added]).
139. See U.S. Cellular Corp. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 78, 80, 89 (D.C. Cir., 2001).
140. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Sugrue, Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau,
to Marlys R. Davis, E-911 Program Manager, King County E-911 Program Office (May 7,
2001) (on file with Author) (responding to a request for clarification from King County,
Washington, and shifting the cost responsibilities for additional facilities to wireless
carriers); see also Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with
Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, Order, 16 FCCR 18,277 (2001) (modifying
requirement that PSAPs be E-911 capable as a prerequisite to a carrier's deployment
obligation, effectively obligating carrier to deploy E-911 prior to the PSAP's actual
readiness).
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III. THE EVOLUTION FROM PUBLIC SAFETY REGULATION TO
HOMELAND SECURITY REGULATION
A. Introduction
The first phase of regulation in this safety and security environment,
initiated in the name of public interest and public safety, involved FCC
leadership of industry toward a goal-traditional regulation. The second
phase is markedly different. It has taken place in the shadow of the tragedy
of 9/11. The new rationale for government involvement has been the
security of the homeland, not safety of the individual, and the process has
evolved toward greater industry involvement in the regulatory outcome, not
just the development of the mandate (as occurred in the first phase). The
phrase "private-public partnerships" has been adopted to describe this
approach.
Three main government initiatives were launched under this
partnership approach to regulation: Wireless Priority Service ("WPS"),
Outage Reporting, and the Critical Infrastructure Information Act ("CIA").
Regarding the wireless industry, the first two began as a partnership
between industry and the FCC. The third, the CHA, was enacted by
Congress to provide private industry with confidence to partner and share
key information with government.' The Bush Administration has publicly
embraced this approach to regulation, calling on industries across the
country to engage in private-public partnerships with the government for
the good of the country.'4 2
This Section traces the development of WPS, Outage Reporting, and
the CHA, and outlines the role that the Network Reliability and
Interoperability Council ("NRIC") may have played in supporting the
general movement to the second phase of homeland security regulation,
public-private partnerships. This section will highlight Priority Access as a
notable example of what can be accomplished when industry and
141. During the debate over the CHA, proponents of the CIIA argued that "private
industry would be unwilling to voluntarily share critical infrastructure information with the
federal government without assurances that its confidential business information would not
be released by the government." GINA MARIE STEVENS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION ACT
CRS-2 (Report for Congress, 2003), at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31547.pdf [hereinafter
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ACT REPORT].
142. See, e.g., Marisa Helms, Ridge Calls for Public-private Partnerships to Improve
Security, MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO, June 20, 2003, at
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/06/20 helmsmridge/; see also Press
Release, United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Bush
Administration Highlights Private-Public Partnership to Increase Minority Homeownership(July 9, 2002), available at http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr02-074.cfm.
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government work together. This section also will analyze the Outage
Reporting proceeding and discuss why ultimately the FCC chose to
mandate an outcome. Finally, this section concludes that the framework
now is in place for partnerships in the name of homeland security between
government and the wireless industry. Again, as at the end of the first
phase, this phase ended with the question remaining as to which model
government will pursue going forward, a continued migration toward
private-public partnerships, or a reversion toward mandates.
B. NRIC: The Foundation for Public-private Partnerships
As the FCC moved into what the Authors of this Article are entitling
the second phase of public safety-homeland security regulation, the FCC
already had a successful example of a voluntary, cooperative, and
beneficial public-private partnership. The NRIC, established in January
1992 as the National Reliability Council following a series of major
landline service outages, 43 now is operating under its seventh charter. 144
Initially developed to study the causes of those outages and work to prevent
their recurrence, this public-private partnership, composed of
representatives from across the telecommunications industry, public safety,
and the FCC, today is an integral component of the effort to secure critical
infrastructure and improve homeland security. 1
45
1. NRIC's historical role in the regulatory process
The NRIC was formed to encourage cooperation among industry,
consumer groups and members of academia, and to draw on these
resources to help guide the FCC's role in enhancing network reliability.
1 46
Over the years, the goals of NRIC have changed, but it continues to be a
successful model of what true industry-government partnerships can
become. Whether the group focuses on ensuring that the country's
telecommunications networks were Year 2000 ("Y2K") compliant, 147 or
143. See NRIC Publications, at http://www.nric.org/pubs/index.html (last visited May
18, 2005).
144. See NETWORK RELIABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL, CHARTER OF THE
NETWORK RELIABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL - CHARTER VII (Apr. 15, 2004)
available at http://www.nric.org/charter-vii/NRICVIICharterFINALAmended_2004_3_
12_04.pdf [hereinafter NRIC CHARTER].
145. The NRIC is a Federal Advisory Committee to the FCC and is currently chartered
to recommend to the FCC and the communications industry ways of assuring optimal
reliability and interoperability of the nation's communication infrastructure. See id. at 1.
146. 2000 Biennial Review - Telecommunications Service Quality Reporting
Requirements, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 22,113, para. 40 (2000).
147. See discussion infra Part III.B.l.a.
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developing and publishing Network Reliability Best Practices, 48 the NRIC
has a track record of success.
a. Preparing for Year 2000
Beginning in 1998, the NRIC focused on two principle questions
regarding the potential problems that could occur across
telecommunications networks as the country moved into the new
millennium: what is the impact of the "year 2000 problem" on
telecommunications networks and services, and what is the current status of
network reliability? As part of its review, the NRIC completed a survey of
international telecommunications readiness covering 84 of the 225
countries throughout the world. Additionally, the NRIC cohosted a one-day
Y2K contingency planning seminar that provided participants "with the
concepts and tools necessary for developing operational contingency plans
around the Year 2000 date change event."' 49
The NRIC established Focus Group One, Subcommittee 2, to pursue
Y2K interoperability testing. This subcommittee assessed Y2K readiness
throughout the industry, analyzed any gaps, and made recommendations.
Over seventy-five companies responded to the group's survey. By October
of 1999, the NRIC declared that the telecommunications industry was
rapidly becoming prepared for the Y2K conversion. 50 After extensive
investigation, the group concluded that "the risk of failure of the domestic
PSTN is minimal, and it is believed that additional testing is not
warranted."''
b. Securing the Reliability of Telecommunications Networks
Once again, in 2002, the NRIC addressed another difficult challenge.
The task was to "facilitat[e] the reliability, robustness, security, and
interoperability of public telecommunications networks.' 52 Specifically,
NRIC was to "prepare and provide recommended requirements for network
148. See discussion infra Part III.B.l.b.
149. NRIC Publications, at http://www.nric.org/pubs/index.html (last visited May 18,
2005).
150. See Press Release, Network Reliability and Interoperability Council, U.S.
Telecommunications Industry Virtually Completes Year 2000 Readiness (Oct. 20, 1999) at
http://www.nric.org/pubs/index.html ("[T]he U.S. Telecommunications Industry is virtually
complete with its Year 2000 remediation and implementation programs and local and long
distance services are expected to continue to function on and after January 1, 2000.").
151. NRIC IV Focus Group One: Subcommittee 2, Powerpoint Presentation at the NRIC
Meeting, at 18 (July 14, 1999), at http://www.nric.org/fg/fgl/sc2/fgl-sc2-julyl4-
presentation.ppt.
152. See Charter of the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council-VI, at
http://www.nric.org/chartervi/index.html (last visited May 18, 2005).
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reliability and network reliability measurements for wireline, wireless,
satellite, and cable public telecommunications networks." The result from
NRIC was the development of over six hundred best practices across
several subject matter areas. As with previous NRIC efforts, this too was a
successful example of private-public partnership.
2. NRIC's Newest Focus-Wireless
The NRIC now faces its newest challenge: wireless. That focus is
evident not only in its charter but also in both its membership and
leadership, as NRIC has evolved to more accurately reflect the
telecommunications industry. While in the past the NRIC Board obviously
contained representatives from the key wireline providers, since 1994 the
group has expanded to include satellite, cable, and wireless industry
leaders. The current leadership reflects this evolution. For the first time, the
chairman of NRIC VII is from a wireless company. Tim Donahue, CEO of
Nextel, leads a very diverse NRIC Board, including representatives from
industry, state regulators and consumer groups." 3 NRIC VII's mission is to
"partner with the Federal Communications Commission, the
communications industry and public safety to facilitate enhancement of
emergency communications networks, homeland security, and best
practices across the burgeoning telecommunications industry."" 4
Specifically, under its current charter,'55 the NRIC VII will address issues
including improvement of E-9 11, increased deployment of broadband, and
possible development of specific best practices for homeland security,
wireless, and public data network services.'56
The NRIC's ability to adapt to both new concerns (Y2K and
homeland security) and a new telecommunications landscape (broadband,
satellite, and wireless) clearly highlights its value to the constantly
changing telecommunications landscape. The NRIC has demonstrated the
effectiveness of the private-public partnership model time and again. The
FCC need only look to the historical performance of NRIC, as well as the
present significance embodied in the development of wireless-specific best
practices,'57 to conclude that it can continue to apply this partnership model
153. See NRIC VII Members, at http://www.nric.org/charter-vii/nric-vii-org.html (last
visited May 18, 2005).
154. NRIC VII Mission Statement, at http://www.nric.org (last visited May 18, 2005).
155. The current charter was renewed in December 2003, amended in April 2004, and
runs through December 2005. NRIC CHARTER, supra note 144, at 9.
156. See id.
157. See NRIC Best Practices, at http://www.bell-labs.com/cgi-user/krauscher/bestp.pl?
textsearch=&networktype=wireless&operator=AND&kw 1=&kw_2=&kw_3=&fieldList=
(last visited May 18, 2005).
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to the growing CMRS industry.
C. Critical Infrastructure Information Act-Building the
Foundation for Partnership
1. Creation of the Act
The passage of the CHA 58 was yet another confirmation that both
Congress and the Bush Administration recognized the importance of
private industry partnering with government. 59 The Act, passed as part of
the larger Homeland Security Act, insures that voluntarily submitted1 6°
information about the country's critical infrastructure would be exempted
from public disclosure.1 6' It reinforces government's desire to partner
voluntarily with industry, as the data submitted to government must be
submitted voluntarily to be eligible for CHA protection. For wireless
carriers, the passage of the CIIA allows the industry to share information
with government officials without the fear of negative publicity, civil
liability, and the possibility that the information will used by competitors.
The importance of that infrastructure, particularly the telecommunications
infrastructure, was demonstrated on 9/11.162 With approximately 85 percent
of the country's infrastructure controlled by private industry, 63 it is
essential that government work with private industry on its protection.
Accordingly, Congress and the Bush Administration set out to create
incentives for industries to voluntarily submit information on the nation's
critical infrastructure. Proponents of the CIA argued that "private industry
would be unwilling to voluntarily share critical infrastructure information
with the federal government without assurances that its confidential
158. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 131-133 (Supp. 2002).
159. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 397-398 (2004), available at http://www.9-
1 lcommission.gov/report/ index.htm [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] ("The
[Department of Homeland Security] is also responsible for working with the private sector
to ensure preparedness ... [H]omeland security and national preparedness therefore often
begins with the private sector.").
160. "Information sharing between public and private entities about threats and
vulnerabilities to critical infrastructures was a central component of the President's
proposal." CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ACT REPORT, supra note 141, at 1.
161. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 131(2) (Supp. 2002) (protecting data
"that is voluntarily submitted to a covered Federal agency").
162. See New Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to
Communications, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 19
F.C.C.R. 16,830, para. 16 (2004) [hereinafter Outage Reporting Order and FNPRM].
163. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 159, at 398.
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business information would not be released by the government."' 64 The
result is a carefully worded Act that facilitates the creation of private-public
partnerships and the sharing of information that otherwise would not be
available to government.
2. Facilitating Information Sharing
To some, the CHA is necessary to ensure private-public
cooperation, 165 to others it is a carve-out from civil liability. 166 Those
opposed to the CIIA stated that the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
Exemption 4167 already grants similar protection to information about
critical infrastructure voluntarily shared with the government. 68 There are,
however, nuanced, but very critical, differences between CIIA and FOIA
Exemption 4. Primarily, the differences involve both the threat of criminal
penalties 69 and the presumption that information under CIIA should not be
released to the public. 7° The CHA "eliminates the presumptive right of
access by any person--corporate or individual, regardless of nationality-
to existing, unpublished, Department of Homeland Security ("DHS")
records on critical infrastructure information. [The CIIA] leaves no
discretion..'' 1 These limitations shift the risk to government to ensure that
such data never is released.
There are several elements of the CIIA that may comfort private
industry as it considers partnering with government, possibly on critical
infrastructure protection. First, "Critical Infrastructure" is defined as, "any
information not customarily in the public domain and related to the security
164. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ACT REPORT, supra note 141, at CRS-2.
165. Id. During the debate over the CIIA, proponents of the CIIA argued that "private
industry would be unwilling to voluntarily share critical infrastructure information with the
federal government without assurances that its confidential business information would not
be released by the government." Id.
166. See Rena Steinzor, "Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors": The Homeland
Security Act and Corporate Accountability, 12 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 641 (2003)
[hereinafter Democracies Die].
167. See id. See also Securing Our Infrastructure: Public-private Information Sharing:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement
of David L. Sobel, General Council, Electronic Privacy Information Center), available at
http://www.senate.gov/%7Egov-affairs/050802sobel.htm.
168. See Outage Reporting Order and FNPRM, supra note 162, paras. 42-46.
169. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 133(f) (Supp. 2002).
170. See Democracies Die, supra note 166, at 654 (discussing the need under FOIA
Exemption 4 for the government to show that information should not be released, compared
to the need under CIIA for the public to show that information does not fit into protected
status).
171. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ACT REPORT, supra note 141, at CRS-6.
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of critical infrastructure of protected systems."' 72 Voluntary is defined by
CHA as the submission of critical infrastructure information "in the
absence of ... [an] agency's exercise of legal authority to compel access to
or submission of such information."' 7 3 These broad definitions provide
government with an opportunity to protect from FOIA disclosure data
received as part of a voluntary public-private partnership.
174
Second, while "voluntary" and "critical infrastructure information"
are defined under CHA, the responsibility for determining the procedure for
receipt, care and storage" of the voluntary critical infrastructure
information lies with the DHS.'75 The CIIA stipulates that DHS must
acknowledge "receipt by Federal agencies of critical infrastructure
information that is voluntarily submitted to the Government. 176 This DHS
determination is the final element in securing a confidential flow of
voluntary information from industry to government. This is so because
DHS, the agency responsible for securing the nation's critical
infrastructure, 7 7 has a vested interest in the continuous flow of information
regarding communications facilities. This process, as explained in section
133 of CHA, confirms the goal of facilitating partnerships.
D. Reporting Wireless Network Outages
In spite of the passage of the CIIA, the FCC in early 2004
adopted an Order requiring segments of the telecommunications
industry, including wireless, to provide data on network outages. As
in the areas of E-911 and CALEA, this requirement initially existed only in
the landline environment. 78 Neither satellite nor wireless carriers were
subject to the FCC's initial service outage reporting rules. In the August 4th
Report and Order, the FCC expanded this requirement to all
communications providers of voice and/or paging services (cable, satellite,
172. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 131(3) (Supp. 2002).
173. Id. § 131(7)(A).
174. CIIA also adds additional exemptions. The submitted information is exempt from
traditional ex parte rules of disclosure, as well as exempt from use in civil lawsuits so long
as the information is submitted in good faith. The information may be disclosed to Congress
and the GAO or "in furtherance of an investigation or the prosecution of a criminal act," but
otherwise it remains protected. See id. § 133(a)(1)(B)-(D).
175. Id. § 133(e)(1).
176. Id. § 133(e)(1)(A).
177. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (Dec. 17, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/
12/20031217-5.html [hereinafter HSPD 7].
178. Section 63.100 of the Commission's rules requires telecommunications carriers,
other than cellular and satellite carriers, to report significant service disruptions. 47 C.F.R. §
63.100 (1992).
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wireless, and wireline carriers are now subject to outage reporting
requirements). 179
For the wireless industry, this proceeding began as a voluntary
partnership between industry and government. It continued the
movement to partnership began in Phase II. However, while the FCC
initially offered several industries, including the wireless industry,
the opportunity to provide the data voluntarily, ultimately the FCC
decided to require the data. The FCC stated that it had charged the
industries not subject to the existing mandatory reporting rules to
provide information voluntarily. 180 According to the FCC, the efforts
of those industries, including wireless, fell short of expectations.' 8'
The FCC believed that it had "a history of several years of unsuccessful
voluntary outage reporting trials" conducted over a four-year period under
a process designed by carriers.'82 Although the FCC had "encouraged
telecommunications providers to participate actively and fully in these
network outage-reporting efforts, [it] observed that participation was spotty
and that the quality of information obtained was very poor."'83
Accordingly, the FCC stopped partnering with industry and
initiated a proceeding to establish a mandate. Mandating reporting of
this information had a significant impact on the wireless industry.
First, the industry lost the opportunity to work with government on a
voluntary basis. Second, by requiring data collection, the
information automatically would fall outside of the CIIA.
Fortunately for the wireless industry, the FCC ultimately concluded
that data received as part of this requirement should be protected from
public disclosure."84 In the proceeding, the FCC received comments from
across industry and from the DHS on a desire to protect this information
from disclosure. Ultimately, the FCC concluded that it would gather this
critical infrastructure information and then securely transmit it to DHS.18 5
The FCC stated that this information would be protected in one of three
179. Outage Reporting Order and FNPRM, supra note 162, paras. 97-114 (2004).
Essentially, the FCC mandated that all carriers must disclose network outages when thirty
minutes of downtime occurs or when 900,000 user minutes are potentially affected. Id. para.
97.
180. Id. para. 18.
181. Id. (stating that "[t]he results of this effort, as of the date of adoption of the Notice,
had not provided us with the quality or quantity of information that we need to accurately
monitor the health of the Nation's telecommunications infrastructure .....
182. Id. para. 37.
183. Id. (citation omitted).
184. See id. para. 3.
185. See id. para 47.
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ways: that it will be covered under CHIA, that it will be covered under
FOIA Exemption 4,186 or that the FCC is required under the Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-7 to protect the sensitive information.'
87
Leading up to the FCC's adoption of the Order, the industry had
worked to secure a voluntary disclosure of the information, hoping to
provide the data under the protection of the CIIA. 188 While the ultimate
outcome of the proceeding was not a voluntary effort, as many in the
wireless industry had requested, consistent with Phase II of homeland
security regulation, the telecommunication industries had an opportunity to
provide the data voluntarily before the FCC ultimately mandated the
reporting. Additionally, after deciding to mandate outage reporting, the
FCC did work with industry on many of the elements of concern. While not
a perfect outcome for the wireless industry, this proceeding confirmed that
the FCC would continue to consider private-public partnerships as a way of
achieving its goals.
E. Wireless Priority Service: the Prototype of the Partnership
Model
While NRIC provides an historical example of a private-public
partnership in telecommunications, and the CHA facilitates partnerships
going forward, WPS is the wireless industry's model of successful
industry-government partnership. The rapid deployment of this service on
the wireless network is a testament to what can happen when a coordinated
government effort meets a motivated industry. From the Bush
Administration's request for an initial priority service shortly after 9/11, to
the deployment nationwide of WPS today, government never proposed a
mandate and always worked with industry toward a voluntary solution.
The model utilized in this proceeding was to simply establish the
ground rules, 189 facilitate and fund development, and then allow industry
experts to develop the solution. Government likely recognized that a true
186. Particularly if it is information that, if disclosed, would put the carrier at a
competitive disadvantage. See id. paras. 42-46.
187. See id. para. 41; HSPD 7, supra note 177.
188. Wireless carriers expressed their belief that a voluntary system outage reporting
system, the Industry-Led Outage Reporting Initiative ("ILORI"), was preferable to
mandatory system outage reporting because they could report to the FCC and DHS
simultaneously and there would be no issue as to whether the reporting was voluntary under
CIIA. See, e.g., Outage Reporting Order and FNPRM, supra note 162, paras. 42-46.
189. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 64.402 (2002) (stating that "[c]ommercial mobile radio
service providers that elect to provide priority access service to National Security and
Emergency Preparedness personnel shall provide priority access service in accordance with
the policies and procedures set forth in Appendix B to this part.").
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understanding of what the industry could do, and when it could be done,
would only accurately come from industry. The result is a public-private
partnership that resulted in a fully functioning service developed in an
extremely short timeframe.
1. The Call for Wireless Priority Service
As with other services or requirements in this field of public safety
(Phase I) and homeland security (Phase II), WPS has its origins in landline
telecommunications. The Government Emergency Telecommunications
System ("GETS") was designed to provide National Security and
Emergency Preparedness ("NSEP") personnel with priority over other
landline traffic in the event of an emergency. 9 ' GETS was developed using
existing features of the landline networks.' While GETS-eligible callers
receive a priority within the queue, they do not preempt any calls.
WPS is similar to the GETS program in several ways. Like GETS,
WPS enables certain NSEP personnel to obtain a priority for the next
available radio channel when necessary to initiate emergency calls.192 Also
like GETS, WPS does not preempt calls in progress. Under WPS,
authorized users activate the feature on a per-call basis by dialing a feature
code such as *XX.1' Callers are given a priority of one through five based
on their NSEP designation, and those users are provided access to CMRS
channels before any other CMRS callers. 94 WPS "is to be available to
authorized NSEP users at all times in equipped CMRS markets where the
service provider has voluntarily decided to provide such service."' 95
The most notable differences between WPS and GETS are the event
that accelerated WPS deployment and the process by which it was
developed. While, as discussed above, WPS shares some similarities with
the GETS program, the wireless service is different in that at its core, the
service is "an enhancement to basic cellular service."' 96 This fact alone
separates WPS from GETS. Because it was not a basic element of wireless
190. Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), at
http://www.atis.org/tg2k/_government-emergency-telecommunicationsservice.html (last
modified Feb. 28, 2001).
191. Id.
192. See Development of Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for
Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety Agency Communication Through the Year
2010, Second Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 16,720, 16,722, para. 5 (2000) [hereinafter
Public Safety Second Order].
193. 47 C.F.R. pt. 64, app. B, at 2.c. (2002).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Wireless Priority Service, at http://wps.ncs.gov (last visited May 18, 2005).
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service, WPS required an action to initiate development and ensure that
there would be continued focus on deployment. The tragedy of 9/11
provided such an action-forcing event.
While discussions of a wireless priority access service began in the
early 1990's, it was not until after 9/11 that government began to request
development of the service. In fact, while the FCC issued a decision to
"allow commercial mobile radio service to offer Priority Access Service
(PAS) to public safety personnel at the Federal, State and local levels to
help meet the national security and emergency preparedness (NSEP) needs
of the Nation" '97 in July of 2000, it was not until after 9/11 that
government's efforts to develop the service accelerated. The National
Security Council, "[r]eacting to the events of 9/11, [issued] guidance to the
National Communications System" to "move forward" on an immediate
wireless priority access solution for the Washington, D.C. market. The
target for such a solution would be sixty days.
98
In parallel, the National Communications System ("NCS") was tasked
with developing a nationwide solution within one year. 99 With these tight
deadlines, government easily could have mandated a solution. Instead, this
request from the National Security Council initiated a two-phase
development effort. The first phase involved the use of "commercially
available and readily implemented technology for limited geographic
areas." The second was "geared to the development of a long-term,
nationally available solution.""
2. Partnering for Success-Waivers, Liability Protection, and
Funding
Prior to development and deployment of a successful WPS, several
elements of the regulatory puzzle had to be addressed. While the National
Security Agency was calling for the rapid development of WPS, the FCC
already had completed some of the important groundwork for development
of the service. First, the FCC determined that it was not going to mandate a
solution. Second, guidelines were established that would form the basis for
developing a solution. Third, the development was funded.
197. Development of Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting
Federal, State and Local Public Safety Agency Communications Requirements Through the
Year 2010 Establishment of Rules and Requirements for Priority Access Service, Second
Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 16,720 (2000) [hereinafter Priority Access Second Report
and Order].
198. See Wireless Priority Service, Program Information, at http://wps.ncs.gov/program-
info.html(last visited May 18, 2005).
199. Id.
200. Id.
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The process began at the FCC in 2000. In a 2000 Report and Order, the
FCC set the stage for a voluntary service when it stated that it would
"permit, but not require, commercial mobile radio service (CMRS)
providers to offer [WPS] to NSEP personnel." 2Ol That first element of the
decision, the conclusion that the service would not be mandated, made
possible a partnership between industry and government.
Next, the FCC addressed some concerns raised by NCS about development
of the service. NCS had argued that the service "had not been fully
developed precisely because the FCC had not yet established operating
protocols for PAS. Once the manufacturers know the protocols they need to
support, or the standards to which they need to adhere, NCS contends the
manufacturers will act accordingly.""2 2 The FCC directly addressed this
concern. It concluded that if a carrier
choose[s] to offer PAS, we are requiring them to adhere to uniform
operating protocols concerning the number of priority levels and the
priority level for particular NSEP users. We believe that uniform
operating protocols will: (a) ensure the compatibility of a peacetime
PAS system with a wartime system; (b) allow federal and out-of-region
NSEP personnel to avail themselves of PAS; and (c) enable a PAS
system to be far more effective. In addition, we conclude that: (a) PAS
will include five priority levels, with non-government NSEP personnel
receiving entitlement to a priority level as appropriate; (b) access to
PAS should be limited to key personnel and those with leadership
responsibilities; and (c) the National Communications System (NCS)
will have responsibility for the day-to-day administration of PAS, with
oversight responsibilities residing with the Commission.2°
The FCC also addressed several very important issues that likely
contributed to rapid development and deployment of the service. First, the
FCC did not "require carriers to adhere to particular technical standards to
implement PAS." As the industry was composed of multiple carriers
providing services on varied platforms, mandating a specific technical
standard could actually slow development. Additionally, the FCC chose not
to require a portion of a carrier's network to be set aside for WPS use.2'
The FCC also addressed the difficult issue of liability. The FCC
201. Priority Access Service Second Report and Order, supra note 197, para. 3.
202. Id. para. 13.
203. Id. para. 4.
204. Id. para. 18.
Some parties comment that carriers offering PAS should be free to limit the
amount of spectrum they make available to PAS so that non-priority users will be
able to access the network. Since PAS will be a voluntary service of CMRS
systems, and since we do not know the extent of the demand for PAS by NSEP
personnel, we will permit carriers to limit PAS to a portion of their spectrum.
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concluded that "a carrier's provision of PAS in accordance with our Rules
will be prima facie lawful under federal law, thereby imposing a heavy
burden on any complainant who claims a violation of the Communications
Act, in particular, a violation of Section 202's anti-discrimination
provisions. '"205 The FCC concluded that "without such protection from
liability, we believe that carriers are unlikely to offer [WPS]. '2 °6
3. Deployment
With the foundation work completed by the FCC in 2000, and
guidance from the Bush Administration in October 2001, the NCS looked
to begin immediate initiation of service for the Washington metropolitan
area and looked to secure service both for New York City and Utah.207
Once again, the FCC acted to facilitate the service. In November of 2001,
VoiceStream Wireless Corporation (now T-Mobile) filed a request with the
FCC seeking a waiver of the rules to provide a wireless priority service to
the NCS. 2 8 This waiver was supported by the NCS, and was required
because T-Mobile's proposed service did not initially conform to the
Report and Order requirement to invoke the priority service on a call-by-
call basis. 2° Instead of forcing compliance with the established guideline,
the FCC adopted a Memorandum, Opinion and Order granting the waiver
request. 2
1°
With the waiver secured, the NCS entered into subcontracts with the
two initial WPS service providers, VoiceStream (now T-Mobile) and
Globalstar. 1 T-Mobile's implementation of the immediate solution became
205. Id. para. 4.
206. Id.
207. Wireless Priority Service, Program Information, at http://wps.ncs.gov/program-
info.html(last visited May 18, 2005).
208. Petition for Partial Waiver of Section 64.402 of the Commission's Rules, Petition
for Partial Waiver, WT Dkt. No. 01-333 (2001) (filed by VoiceStream Wireless Corp.).
209. See VoiceStream Petition for Waiver of Section 64.402 of the Commission's Rules,
Statement in Support of Petition for Waiver, WT Dkt. No. 01-333 (2001) (filed on behalf of
the National Communications System). The NCS is an organization created by Executive
Order to administer and manage the telecommunications assets of twenty-three federal
government organizations in serving the national security and emergency preparedness
("NSEP") needs of the federal, state and local governments. See Exec. Order No. 12,472, 49
Fed. Reg. 13,471 (Apr. 3, 1984). VoiceStream Wireless Corporation, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 6134, para. 1 n.3 (2002) [hereinafter VoiceStream Petition Order].
210. VoiceStream Petition Order, supra note 209.
211. The NCS provided Globalstar satellite phones to quickly field the immediate WPS
in the Salt Lake City area during the Olympics for over 600 users. Globalstar increased
satellite capacity and redirected Utah calls directly to a US-based earth station. Globalstar
also increased landline trunking at the earth station for GETS calls. See Wireless Priority
Service, at http://wps.ncs.gov (last visited May 18, 2005).
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operational during May 2002 in Washington and New York. By November
2002, T-Mobile supported 2084 WPS users in Washington and 725 in New
York, for a total of 2809 WPS wireless users.2
12
4. Exporting the Partnership Model
The decisions by the FCC, the DHS, and Congress to allow the
wireless industry to develop and deploy a WPS solution accelerated its
deployment. Quick action, and inaction, by the FCC, combined with
successful stewardship of the development process by DHS, resulted in
rapid roll-out of an operational system. The service now is being offered by
three CMRS carriers (T-Mobile, Cingular, and Nextel) that provide service
throughout the country.213 That effort continues as the NCS works toward
deploying the service across the CDMA platform. As of December 2004,
there were over 11,000 WPS users, with the goal of expanding to 200,000
GSM users and 150,000 CDMA users.21 4
F. The Legacy of the Second Phase of Homeland Security
Regulation
Despite the final outcome of the Outage Reporting proceeding, the
framework now is in place for private-public partnerships in the name of
homeland security between government and the wireless industry. The
Outage Reporting Order is an illustration that the FCC will mandate
regulation if it believes that industry is not proceeding quickly under a
voluntary regime. In the case of Outage Reporting, it was not the process of
partnering that was broken, but rather that particular partnering process.
The FCC believed that the industry did not do enough to warrant a
voluntary approach.
Alternatively, the FCC has two precedents with which it is intimately
familiar where partnerships with industry clearly have been beneficial-
NRIC and WPS. Comparing those two successes with the recent history of
Outage Reporting and the long-term implementation issues surrounding E-
911 and CALEA, the industry's incentive to partner is strong. The key
question is which path of homeland security regulation will the
government, particularly the FCC, employ going forward?
212. Id.
213. See Press Release, National Communications System, NCS Begins Deployment of
Nationwide Wireless Priority Service (Jan. 21, 2003), available at http://wps.ncs.gov/
documents/NCS%20Begins%2ODeployment%20of%20Nationwide%20WPS.pdf.
214. See Wireless Priority Service, http://wps.ncs.gov (last visited May 18, 2005)
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IV. PHASE III: IN THE NAME OF HOMELAND SECURITY-To
PARTNER OR NOT?
A third phase of homeland security regulation has begun. As
government addresses issues such as Emergency Alerts. 5 and protection of
critical infrastructure, the key question remains-which regulatory model
government will utilize. At the intersection of homeland security and
wireless, the best result is likely to come from partnering with industry. To
use the first phase of public safety regulation, where the ultimate end-point
was regulation, could lead to a duplication of E-91 1 and CALEA. Use of a
modified second phase approach, such as in Outage Reporting, likely also
will not result in the best outcome for the FCC, industry, or the American
public. Alternatively, addressing these new issues through a cooperative
and voluntary government initiative could result in the type of creative and
timely thinking and development found in both the WPS proceeding and
throughout NRIC.
This perspective was reflected in multiple comments to the FCC's
recently released Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Emergency Alert
System ("EAS").216 In the NPRM, the FCC questioned whether the EAS
was outdated because it relied "almost exclusively on delivery through
analog radio and television broadcast stations and cable systems." 't7 The
FCC in fact asked whether there should be a "concerted industry-
government effort to combine EAS with alternative public alert and
warning systems."2"8 T-Mobile, Nortel, and others supported the idea of a
government-industry partnership." 9
As the comments highlight, a collaborative industry-government
approach makes particular sense with regard to the wireless industry.
During the last five years, there has been a steady wave of technological
change. The industry has moved from TDMA to CDMA, GSM, and iDEN,
and has utilized, or will utilize, technologies including lxRTT, UMTS,
215. See Review of the Emergency Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19
F.C.C.R. 15,775 (2004) [hereinafter Emergency Alert System NPRM].
216. See Review of the Emergency Alert System, Reply Comments of T-Mobile USA, EB
Dkt. 04-296, at 1-2 (Nov. 24, 2004) [hereinafter T-Mobile Reply Comments] (stating that
"as the FCC considers how to address EAS, it should allow carriers the flexibility to develop
solutions and technology in cooperation with the relevant government agencies."); Review
of the Emergency Alert System, Reply Comments of Nortel, EB Dkt. 04-296, at 3 (Nov. 29,
2004) [hereinafter Nortel Reply Comments] (suggesting that an industry/government forum
be established to begin to investigate a definition of EAS.).
217. Emergency Alert System NPRM, supra note 215, para. 32.
218. Id.
219. See generally T-Mobile Reply Comments, supra note 216; Nortel Reply Comments,
supra note 216.
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IxEVDO, GPRS, EDGE, UMTS, and WCDMA to deliver voice and data
over the wireless networks. The continued evolution of the wireless
network makes engineering new government requests into existing
services, without disturbing those existing services, extremely difficult.
The same issues exist regarding the protection of critical
infrastructure. Government is calling on private industry to identify key
assets, assess vulnerabilities, and prioritize assets to guide effective
protection programs.2" The goal is to reduce vulnerability, deter threats,
and minimize consequences of attacks.22" ' Who better to inform those
efforts and achieve those goals than industry. Obviously no one knows the
integral elements of a wireless network better than its engineers. To ask
government to identify what is a priority within an individual private
company is extraordinarily difficult. The DHS recognized this and calls for
an integrated effort across government and including private sector
owners.
222
In both of these proceedings, government calls for a concerted or
integrated effort with industry. In both cases, industry is working
voluntarily with government to address the concerns highlighted in the
FCC's NPRM and DHS's Interim NIPP. Government has yet to determine
whether it will establish a mandate in either of these proceedings, but at
least initially it is asking questions and seeking comments as if partnership
is the goal. Depending on industry efforts and government response, the
third phase of homeland security regulation is beginning to resemble a true
partnership between government and industry.
V. CONCLUSION
The future obviously only holds more changes for the wireless
industry. When the CALEA and E-911 proceedings began over ten years
ago, no one in government could have predicted where the industry would
be today. As the FCC considers alerts to mobile handsets of wireless
subscribers, the regulatory choice should be simple. The same is true
regarding the protection of critical infrastructure. As evidenced by the WPS
program, the partnership approach likely is far superior to address
homeland security issues than the command and control models employed
in both E-911 and CALEA. Going forward, any government effort that can
be accomplished with the full support of industry through voluntary
220. See DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, INTERIM NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION PLAN 2 (2005), available at http://www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq-wb-
wws-interim-nipp.pdf.
221. See id. at 1.
222. See id.
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industry-government partnerships should be handled as such.
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